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ARE TRAFFIC VIOLATORS CRIMINALS? SEARCHING FOR ANSWERS IN 
EXPERIENCES OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
 
Road traffic accidents (RTAs) are a major cause of mortality and serious morbidity with high 
costs along the entire European Union (EU) geography (Castillo-Manzano et al., 2014; Orsi et 
al., 2012). Worldwide, among the issues that contribute to the occurrence of RTAs, most of 
studies highlight behavioral factors as a principal explanation; particularly those that reduce 
capabilities (drowsiness, fatigue, alcohol or drug consumption) or increase risk while driving 
(traffic offences, driver stress, violence and aggressiveness in traffic, motor vehicle crimes) 
(Petridou & Moustaki, 2000 analyze this classification in depth).      
 
After initial studies such as Portefield (1960), in the last two decades special attention has 
been paid in the literature to the connection between road traffic safety and criminal behavior. 
The roles of both traffic law enforcement (TLE) and legal systems have been highlighted as 
deterrence and punitive measures to improve compliance with traffic rules (see the 
comprehensive international overviews provided by Brace et al., 2009 and Zaal, 1994, 
respectively). Much research has provided evidence worldwide that people with antisocial 
attitudes who commit aggressive and other offences due to a lack of assimilation of social 
norms, are more frequently involved in risky situations in general (see e.g. Fischer and 
Poland, 1998 on how social exclusion may even serve as a control mechanism when 
traditional means of social control such as punishments or deterrence are ineffective or 
insufficient) and are specifically more prone to RTAs and traffic violations (Broughton, 2007; 
Săucan et al., 2012; Sümer, 2003; West et al., 1993).  
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In fact, the relationship between road safety and criminality has been addressed by applying 
different psychological, sociological and criminological research approaches (Brace et al., 
2009; Junger et al., 1995a, for a broad analysis). For instance: the tendency to commit crime 
according to personality traits (with the theory labeled as “Mild Social Deviance” based on 
involvement in accidents associated with expression of hostile attitudes, aggression and 
antisocial forms of behavior, Meadows et al., 1998; West et al., 1993); diverse situational 
hypotheses that suggest that the way one drives is closely linked to other behavioral traits in 
one’s personal and social life, because driving behavior is actually a part of a complex system 
determined by attitudinal and motivational factors that affect individuals in their relations 
with society (the so-called “Self-control Theory” and “Social Control Theory” and the 
“Hierarchical Approach” applied to traffic research by Hatakka et al., 2002; Junger et al., 
1995b; Junger & Tremblay, 1999, among others). 
 
However, the connection between criminal or unsafe behavior and road safety seems to be a 
relatively under-researched topic both nationally and above all internationally. Different 
causal links are explored in the literature, predominantly: between general crimes and traffic 
offences with an special emphasis in recidivism (Broughton, 2007; Palk et al., 2005; Rose, 
2000); between antisocial or negative behavior (homicide, robbery, consumption of alcohol 
and illicit drugs) and dangerous driving (Everett et al., 1999; Marshall et al., 1996); and to a 
minor degree, the relationship between general criminal behavior and RTAs (in terms of the 
number or accidents, fatalities or injury rates) (Giacopassi & Forde, 2000; Porterfield, 1960). 
Although there is a general consensus on the main theoretical hypotheses that a strong 
correlation holds, certain authors state that this might be spurious and that the statistical 
association between crime and RTAs is actually the result of a common causal process related 
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to socioeconomic context (age and sex, risk exposure to accident, income level, 
unemployment, etc.), (Junger et al., 1995a, 1995b; Junger & Tremblay, 1999; Sivak, 1983). 
 
Our contribution to the literature falls into this field. The main aim of the current study is to 
examine econometrically the association between criminal behavior and traffic fatalities per 
capita through a panel for the 28 current member states of the European Union (EU28) for the 
1999-2010 period. We aim to test the hypothesis that crime rates (and specifically, motor 
vehicle-related crimes) may be considered as predictors of fatal RTAs. Following Brace et al. 
(2009) and Giacopassi & Forde (2000), there has been very little research undertaken to 
explore the effects of the relationship between general criminal behavior and crash 
involvement specifically.  
We consider that our research has several advantages over previous studies that guarantee its 
originality. Firstly, this issue has received some attention from researchers in certain countries 
that have analyzed the issue at the national level; although, to our knowledge, no previous 
study considers a broad panel of countries, or focuses specifically on the influence of criminal 
behavior (not only general crime but also specific motor vehicle crime) on death from traffic 
accidents.  
 
Secondly, our study also aims to explore the role of the legal system on the relationship 
between criminality rates and RTAs from a geographical point of view, for the EU28 
countries. Logically, the EU28 countries show a heterogeneous spectrum of cultural attitudes 
and social norms (Vereeck & Vrolix, 2007), and also a wide range of traffic law frameworks 
(e.g., several countries with better road safety records, such as the Netherlands, processes 
traffic offenses under administrative laws, while other leaders such as the United Kingdom 
apply a criminal traffic law system; ETSC, 1999). In fact, some studies state that compliance 
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with the traffic rules (and with general law) in each country, is dependent not only on the 
social attitudes of road users or certain behavior, but also on the optimization of the law and 
its enforcement (TLE for traffic) that should form part of a global strategy to improve road 
safety: legislation, education, enforcement and judicial procedures (see e.g. Wegman, 1992).  
The effects of changes in the level of sanctions (tickets and fines, jail sentences, 
demerit/penalty points systems) or enforcement (number of police officers, number of breath 
tests for alcohol/drugs, speed cameras) on the level of road safety (accident rates) has been 
analyzed by much economic research interested in an optimal allocation of scarce resources, 
but with no conclusive findings. Nevertheless, there seems to be general agreement that 
enforcement of road rules should be aimed primarily at deterrence, being accompanied by 
publicity that is unpredictable and difficult to avoid, with a mixture of highly visible and less 
visible activities and continued over a long period of time because the effects are short term 
(Stanojević et al., 2012; Zaal, 1994). Special attention has been paid by authors such as 
Deshapriya & Iwase (1996) and Tay (2005, 2010) to the severity of sanctions as a deterrence 
mechanism to increase the individual’s perceived risk of apprehension and punishment. In the 
road safety arena, stricter sanctions seem to achieve better and faster results if they are mainly 
determined by the legislature and administrative/judiciary system (i.e., the introduction of 
tougher jail sentences and punishments may reduce traffic violation rates, although for a 
limited period; see for example cases as varied as Castillo-Manzano et al., 2011 for Spain; Li 
et al., 2014 for Hong Kong; Liberatti et al., 2001 for Brazil; Montag, 2014 for the Czech 
Republic or Sen, 2001 for Canada). Therefore, in this paper we examine the nature of the 
most severe legal systems as determining factors of the level of EU28 road safety.  
In short, we attempt to determine if there may be a clear correlation between road fatality 
rates and the mainstream types of crime at an international level, which would serve to justify, 
at least prima facie, the increasingly widespread tendency to consider traffic offences as 
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crimes and toughen the penalties imposed in the penal codes. Following this argument, we 
simultaneously analyze whether the degree of severity of the legal system applied to traffic 
offences could be a good tool in the constant struggle of Western societies to diminish the 
drama of RTAs.  
After this theoretical introduction, the following sections present the methodological 
framework of our research, a discussion of our findings and finally a summary of our main 
conclusions.  
 
2. VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY. 
 
In our empirical analysis, we develop a fixed-effects model that takes the following form for 
country i during period t:  
 
                    Yit = α + βkXit + γkZit + λkWit + μi + νt + εit                                                          (1)     
 
where Yit is the log of the total per capita fatality rate (within 30 days of the accident, 
according to the Vienna Convention definition)
1
, Xit refers to variables that identify the 
criminal attitudes of the country’s inhabitants, Zit contains the vector of the country’s 
economic and demographic attributes, and Wit are both the severity of legal system-related 
variables as proxies of law enforcement, and specific variables related to road safety policies. 
μi are country fixed effects that control for omitted time-invariant country-specific variables, 
νt are year dummies that control for the common trend in all the countries in the dataset and εit 
is a mean-zero random error.   
                                                          
1
 Albalate (2008), Albalate & Bel (2011), Dee (2001) and Eisenberg (2003) consider that this is the most 
appropriate dependent variable for assessing road traffic fatalities as the interpretation of policy variables is 
clearer.  
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We use data for the EU28 countries for the time period from 1999 to 2010. This means that 
this is the broadest database in terms of both time and geography used in an analysis with 
these objectives. Table 1 provides the descriptions, information sources and descriptive 
statistics (mean and standard deviation) of all the variables used in the analysis.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
As we state above, the main aim of our empirical analysis is to examine whether the criminal 
attitudes of the inhabitants of a country have an effect on traffic fatality rates. According to 
earlier studies (Brace et al., 2009; Junger et al., 1995a; Junger et al., 2001b; Porterfield, 1960; 
Sivak, 1983; Sümer, 2003), we may expect a positive correlation between criminal activities 
and the attitudes of drivers on the road, in the sense of a higher likelihood that they are 
involved in a fatal RTA. The hypothesis we test here is that levels of social aggression are a 
predictor of traffic accidents: higher crime rates are associated with more deaths on the roads, 
bearing in mind the possible influence of the spuriousness thesis supported by scholars such 
as Junger et al. (1995a) and Sivak (1983), as we mentioned in the Introduction above. In 
equation (1) we include four explanatory variables that identify the criminality rates of a 
country’s population, and we also consider some control variables that are described in the 
following paragraphs.  
 
We collected complete data for two variables related with general criminality rates, also used 
by previous empirical research, although it only considered specific countries (Giacopassi & 
Forde, 2000; Junger et al., 1995b; Junger et al., 2001a; Sivak, 1983): the number of homicides 
and the number of robberies. Moreover, as we mention above in the Introduction, almost all 
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the earlier research focused on general crime variables or on typical driving violations-related 
variables, such as alcohol consumption (Deshapriya & Iwase, 1996; Petrie et al., 2010; West 
et al., 1993) or others, such as so-called “joy-riding” crime (Marshall et al., 1996). By other 
hand, authors such as Bromley and Nelson, 2002, find that alcohol is noted as a contributory 
factor in recorded crimes.  
 
Furthermore, we include two variables of crimes specifically linked to road vehicle traffic: the 
number of drug trafficking crimes and the number of motor vehicle thefts. All these variables 
are measured in relative terms according to the country’s population. While we may expect 
that the coefficient associated with the crime variables is positive, such an effect should be 
particularly relevant for those variables, such as drugs, that are more linked to road vehicle 
traffic, in agreement with Gjerde et al. (2011) and Smink et al. (2005) for certain countries.  
 
Along with variables related with different types of crime in the country’s population, we also 
analyze whether the severity of the criminal justice system influences road mortality ratios. 
As a proxy for the severity of the penal/legal system in a country, we include an index 
variable that takes the value zero if no life imprisonment sentence may be applied, the value 
one if such a sentence is revisable and the value 2 if the indefinite sentence is not revisable. 
Our expectation is that the coefficient associated with this variable will be negative, following 
prior results of e.g., Castillo-Manzano et al. (2011), Liberatti et al. (2001) Montag, 2014 or 
Sen (2001) regarding the beneficial effects of stricter punishment applied to traffic violators, 
specifically on road safety outcomes. Indeed, the traffic fatality rates may be lower in 
countries with more severe penal/legal/administrative systems as the penal systems may have 
a strong influence on the social behavior of citizens and drivers.  
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We also consider additional variables for road safety policies. Following previous studies on 
road safety (Albalate, 2008; Castillo-Manzano & Castro-Nuño, 2012; Castillo-Manzano et al., 
2013, 2014; Deshapriya & Iwase, 1996; Eisenberg, 2003; McCarthy, 2005), we consider the 
influence of preventive policies such as legal blood alcohol limits, and include a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one for countries and periods where the maximum blood alcohol 
concentration allowed is lower than 0.5 g/L. Most EU28 countries have set the limit at 0.5 or 
lower, so we are able to test whether blood alcohol concentration rates lower than 0.5 are 
effective in reducing road traffic fatalities.  
 
Additionally, we include a variable that captures the application of points-based driving 
licenses. Indeed, one of the explanatory variables in equation (1) is an index variable that 
takes the value one if a penalty driving license system is applied, the value two if a demerit 
driving license system is applied and the value zero if any points system is applied. We expect 
to find a negative sign in the coefficient associated with this variable. The introduction and 
application of any points system to driving licenses may lead to lower traffic fatality rates (i.e. 
the strong deterrence effect analyzed by De Paola et al., 2013 for Italy), although the long-
term effect of this policy has been questioned (see Castillo-Manzano & Castro-Nuño, 2012, 
for an international meta-analysis of the effects of such policies).  
 
Another road traffic policy variable that we take into account is for the maximum speed limit 
allowed on motorways. According to previous studies (Afukaar, 2003; Elvik, 2012), we may 
expect a positive sign in the coefficient associated with this variable, as a higher speed limit 
(and its subsequent enforcement) may have as a consequence higher road traffic fatalities. 
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With respect to control factors, we include variables that are typically used in studies of road 
traffic safety and that are related to the country’s economic conditions. In this vein, we 
include the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) as an indicator of the country’s 
economic development (Castillo-Manzano et al., 2013, 2014; García-Ferrer et al., 2007; 
Grimm & Treibich, 2012; Orsi et al., 2012).   
 
The relationship between a country’s economic development and road traffic fatalities is 
complex and we may expect that it takes a non-linear form (Anbarci et al., 2006; Bishai et al., 
2006; Kopits & Cropper, 2005). Indeed, fatality rates may increase with economic 
development in very poor countries due to increased exposure to RTAs. However, the 
relationship between economic development and traffic fatality rates may become flat or even 
invert after reaching a certain wealth threshold. We test the hypothesis concerning non-
linearity between GDP and traffic fatalities by including the GDP and the square of the GDP 
as explanatory variables. If the non-linear relationship is confirmed, then the coefficient 
associated with the GDP variable will be positive and the coefficient associated to the square 
of the GDP variable will be negative.  
 
Meanwhile, studies show that overall crime rates and property crimes are higher when 
economic conditions are poor due to unemployment or recession (Krüger, 2011) with a 
positive relation evidenced for the EU by Altindag (2012). Other studies even suggest how 
income inequality may play an important role in the determination of the crime rate (Sachsida 
et al., 2010), following the rational crime theory, because the opportunity cost of committing 
a crime seems to decrease and the net individual’s benefit might be higher (Krüger, 2013). 
GDP is therefore quite a useful control variable when the intention is to study any possible 
correlation with crime rates. 
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The country’s level of motorization is also taken into account. This variable is related to the 
development of private transportation. It is not clear what relationship with road traffic 
fatalities should be expected. On the one hand, higher levels of motorization may imply 
higher exposure to RTAs. On the other hand, more developed countries may enjoy better 
infrastructure and vehicles, more advanced policies and more beneficial social attitudes 
towards road safety (Kopits & Cropper, 2005). In this vein, Albalate (2008) and Albalate & 
Bel (2011) found a negative relationship between traffic fatalities and the level of 
motorization.  
 
The number of passenger-kilometers weighted by country population is an additional 
explanatory variable in our model. This variable seeks to capture the risk exposure through 
the intensity of traffic on the roads, in the sense described by Kılıç & McCarthy (2012). We 
could expect a positive relationship between the amount of traffic and rate of road fatalities 
since the total amount of driving is an indication of the population’s exposure to road accident 
risk (Albalate & Bel, 2011; McCarthy, 2005; Orsi et al., 2012). However, such a relationship 
could be dependent upon congestion levels (Li et al., 2012).  
 
We also take into account the influence of the quality of the transport infrastructure by 
including a variable for motorway density. The expected sign of the coefficient associated to 
this variable is negative. Indeed, we may expect a negative relationship between the quality of 
transport infrastructure and road traffic fatality rates as found in Albalate & Bel (2012), 
Jamroz (2012) and Noland (2003).  
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Moreover, we also consider two control variables related with the percentage of vulnerable 
population in the country. First, we include a variable for the percentage of population over 
60 years old. Second, we also consider a variable for the percentage of population aged 20-39 
years old. While we may expect that risk exposure is higher for a younger population because 
younger road users usually take more risks (Langford et al., 2006), the impact of accidents 
may be higher for older road users so that morbidity and mortality are higher for older 
populations (Braver & Trempel, 2004; Yee et al., 2006). Thus, we expect a positive sign in 
the coefficient associated with both explanatory variables; but its statistical significance is not 
clear.  
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION. 
 
Table 2 shows the variance decomposition of the continuous variables used in the empirical 
analysis in two orthogonal components: the within-component (variability within each 
country) and the between-component (variability across countries). This table shows that the 
variability across countries is higher than the variability within each country for all variables 
except the vehicle-km driven.  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
The estimates may present heteroscedasticity and temporal autocorrelation problems in the 
error term. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data shows that we may have a 
problem of serial autocorrelation that must be addressed. However, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test indicates that we do not have a problem with heteroscedasticity. We also apply 
the panel unit root test developed by Levin et al. (2002), which can be regarded as an 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test when lags are included. This test indicates that there is 
no non-stationarity problem with our dependent variable. 
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Taking the results of these tests into account, we performed the estimation using the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method including dummies for countries and years. To deal with the 
problem of serial autocorrelation, we assume an AR(1) process in the error term. Table 3 
contains the results of the estimates of the determinants of road traffic fatalities equation.  
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
We find evidence of a non-linear relationship between road traffic fatality rates and countries’ 
economic development. Indeed, the coefficient associated with the GDP variable is positive 
and statistically significant, while the square of the same variable is negative and also 
statistically significant.  
 
The coefficient associated with the motorization variable is negative and statistically 
significant. Thus, we find lower road fatality rates in countries with higher levels of 
motorization. It seems that the effect of better infrastructure and vehicles prevails over higher 
exposure to RTAs. In a similar vein, we also find that the coefficient associated with the 
motorway density variable is negative and statistically significant, which confirms that the 
quality of transport infrastructure has a significant effect on road safety. 
 
In addition, the coefficient associated with the variable of vehicle-kilometers driven is not 
statistically significant. More traffic on the roads implies higher exposure to accidents but this 
effect may be partially compensated by lower speeds (and therefore less severe accidents) due 
to congestion.  
 
The coefficient associated with the variable for older populations has a positive sign and it is 
statistically significant, while the coefficient associated with the variable for younger 
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populations is positive but not statistically significant. These findings are consistent with the 
idea that risk exposure is higher for a younger population, although the impact of accidents 
means that morbidity and mortality are higher for an older population. Indeed, elderly 
collision victims may have an increased risk of morbidity and mortality because of increased 
fragility.  
 
Concerning road safety policies, those related to the maximum blood alcohol concentration 
and speed limits seem to be effective in reducing traffic fatalities. The coefficients associated 
with both variables have the expected signs and they are statistically significant.  
 
Importantly, we find evidence that the criminal attitudes of a country’s inhabitants have a 
relevant influence on road traffic fatality rates. In particular, the coefficients of the variables 
that measure the number of crimes more specifically linked prima facie with traffic violations 
are positive and statistically significant. Indeed, higher numbers of drug trafficking crimes 
and motor vehicle thefts lead to higher road traffic fatality rates in the country. The 
coefficients of the other variables that measure the general level of criminality in the country, 
the number of homicides and robberies, are also positive but not clearly statistically 
significant. Note here that the statistical significance of the variable for robberies is at the 
11% level. In addition to this, the coefficient associated with the variable for life 
imprisonment is negative and statistically significant, as expected.  
 
Note that these findings are obtained from a rich dataset that includes 28 countries for 12 
years and by considering many control variables. The overall explanatory power of our model 
is very high with an R
2 
close to 1. Hence, we should be confident that our results are not 
affected by spurious correlations due to the existence of omitted variables that are correlated 
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with traffic fatalities per capita and the main explanatory variables we are interested in, as was 
suggested could be the case in the studies of Junger et al. (1995a, 1995b), Junger & Tremblay 
(1999) and Sivak (1983).  
 
Overall, we find evidence that the road traffic fatality rates are higher in countries where the 
inhabitants have more socially aggressive behavior, while the traffic fatality rates are lower in 
countries with more severe penal systems. Tougher national legislation seems to send a signal 
to the population in general and drivers in particular, about the visibility of stricter TLE and 
heavier sanctions and penalties schemes, creating a deterrence effect on driving attitudes.  
 
Both these results may be in line with the Giacopassi & Forde’s theory (Giacopassi & Forde, 
2000) known as “Crumpled Fenders” (the traffic equivalent to Wilson & Kelling’s “Broken 
Windows” theory; Wilson & Kelling, 1982) about criminality rates (particularly motor 
vehicle crimes, in our case) that might be used as an indicator of lawlessness, leading not only 
to a disregard of traffic rules but to a higher fatal crash rate
2
.  
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 
 
As we detail in the Introduction above, the issue of the correlation between criminality and 
road safety has been addressed by many studies, but relatively few of them explore the 
relationship between criminal behavior and fatal accidents from an econometric perspective. 
There is a need for more detailed research in this area, especially into any link between crime 
and RTA outcomes (fatalities, injuries); and even more so when the research is carried out 
                                                          
2
 “The belief is that an orderly environment is necessary to establish pro-social community norms which, in turn, 
can be nurtured to support law enforcement and to suppress criminal behavior” (Giacopassi & Forde, 2000, p. 
402). 
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using a sample taken from a broad number of countries rather than only from the analysis of 
some specific case studies. This study therefore fills a gap in the research on this topic. 
 
Our findings suggest that the relationships between traffic-related crime and becoming a 
victim of an RTA hold for a very broad range of economic conditions and traffic risk 
exposure, types of vulnerable population and diverse road safety policies. In particular, our 
research provides confirmation of a non-linear relationship between road traffic fatality rates 
and countries’ economic conditions (according to previous scholars such as Anbarci et al., 
2006; Bishai et al., 2006 or Kopits & Cropper, 2005); that the effect of better infrastructure 
and vehicles prevails over higher levels of motorization (in line with Albalate & Bel, 2011; 
Jamroz, 2012 or Noland, 2003); that higher exposure to accidents (due to more traffic) may be 
partially compensated by lower speeds (due to traffic congestion), following Li et al. (2012); 
that risk exposure is higher for younger population although, from the point of view of the 
impact of accidents, morbidity and mortality are higher for an older population (consistent 
with Langford et al., 2006 and Yee et al., 2006); that road fatality rates are inversely related to 
strategies such as the maximum blood alcohol concentration rate allowed and speed limits (in 
accordance with Afukaar, 2003 or Deshapriya & Iwase, 1996), although we do not find clear 
effectiveness of the points-based driving license policy (following earlier studies, this policy 
may lead to reduced road deaths, but with a questioned long-term effect; see Castillo-
Manzano & Castro-Nuño, 2012).  
In addition, our results seem to support previous studies that have shown that fatal accident 
involvement might be predicted by an individual’s criminal history and behavioral factors, 
even when we consider other control variables that could affect this correlation. However, 
unlike earlier studies based on experiences in specific countries (such as Brace et al., 2009; 
Junger et al., 1995a; Junger et al., 2001b; Porterfield, 1960; Sivak, 1983; Sümer, 2003), our 
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study is of a broad sample: EU28 and a full twelve years of research, and shows that this is 
not a generic relationship but is limited to specific criminal behavior being linked to reckless 
driving. These are specifically the offense categories of motor vehicle theft and drug 
trafficking, which closely correlate with traffic accidents.  
Another relevant result of our research is that there is also a clear correlation between a 
reduction in the road fatality rate and the life imprisonment variable, which can be considered 
to be a clear proxy of the general stringency of each country’s criminal code. Thus, the 
severity of the sanction may be used as a deterrence mechanism to increase the individual’s 
perceived risk of apprehension and punishment (a signal about the visibility of stricter TLE 
and heavier sanctions); and social control might be achieved through deterrence by stricter 
laws.  
All these comments support the idea of a clear correlation between criminal behavior and 
RTAs, inasmuch as specific strategies used to contend with the former also help to reduce 
RTAs. The road fatality rates seem to be higher in European countries where the inhabitants 
show more socially aggressive behavior, while they are lower in countries with more severe 
penal systems.  
 
Finally, together all these findings could be considered to be indirect empirical support for 
countries such as Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic or Spain that have toughened sanctions 
to combat road accidents, either through heavier economic and administrative sanctions or 
even jail sentences, which are envisaged in their penal codes for reckless behavior behind the 
wheel. In short, it shows support for the countries that treat this reckless behavior and the 
people responsible for it as criminals.  
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TABLE 1. Variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Variables Description Source Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Per capita fatalities Fatality rates per million inhabitants 
CARE (EU road accidents 
database) 
108.44 45.04 
Life imprisonment 
 
Index variable that takes the value 0 
if no life imprisonment sentence may 
applied; 1 if imprisonment sentence is 
revisable (pardon, amnesty or other 
release may be applied); 2 if 
indefinite sentence is not revisable 
INTERNATIONAL 
JUSTICE RESOURCE 
CENTER 
1.57 0.67 
Homicides 
Number of homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants 
(Intentional killing of a person, 
including murder, manslaughter, 
euthanasia and infanticide) 
  EUROSTAT 
2.24 2.31 
Robbery 
Robbery crimes per 100,000 
inhabitants 
(Stealing from a person with force or 
threat of force, including muggings- 
bag-snatching and theft with 
violence) 
EUROSTAT 88.83 70.35 
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Drugs 
drug trafficking crimes per 100,000 
inhabitants 
(Illegal possession, cultivation, 
production, supplying, transportation, 
importing, exporting, financing etc. 
of drug operations which are not 
solely in connection with personal 
use) 
EUROSTAT 66.34 65.82 
Motor vehicle theft 
 
Motor vehicle theft per 100 000 
inhabitants 
(Theft of all land vehicles with an 
engine that run on the road which are 
used to carry people, including cars, 
motorcycles, buses, lorries) 
EUROSTAT 219.55 184.68 
Per capita GDP 
Per capita gross domestic product in 
International Comparable Prices 
(US$ at 2005 prices and PPP) 
UNECE Statistical 
Division Database, 
compiled from official 
national and international 
(CIS, EUROSTAT, IMF, 
OECD) sources 
24960 11653 
Motorization 
Number of registered vehicles per 
1000 inhabitants 
UNECE transport division, 
Eurostat, World Bank and 
national databases 
424.74 111.99 
Vehicles-km driven 
Number of passenger-cars-km 
expressed in 1000 million km and 
weighted by national population 
European Commission 
(Directorate General for 
mobility and transport) 
39.97 317.52 
Motorway density 
Number kms of motorways divided 
by square km of the country 
EUROSTAT and UNECE 1.69 1.73 
Old % population over 60 years old EUROSTAT 20.67 2.52 
Young %  population aged 20-39 years EUROSTAT 28.75 1.92 
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BAC_05 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 
1 for countries and periods where the 
maximum blood alcohol 
concentration rate allowed is less than 
0.5 
 
European Commission 
Road Safety Website 
0.28 0.45 
Point system 
 
Index variable that takes the value 1 
if the penalty system driving license 
is applied; 2 if the demerit system 
driving license is applied; 0 if any 
point system is applied 
European Transport Safety 
Council (ETSC) 
 
0.92 0.88 
Speed limits Maximum speed limits (km/hour) 
European Commission 
Road Safety Website 
121.5 13.51 
 
TABLE 2. Variance decomposition of continuous variables 
Variables Variability across countries Variability within each country 
Per capita fatalities 37.68 25.60 
Homicides 2.23 0.73 
Robbery 65.18 29.99 
Drugs 61.60 25.75 
Motor vehicle theft 
 
168.78 80.95 
Per capita GDP 11610.77 2248.88 
Motorization 105.03 42.40 
Vehicles-km driven 147.84 282.27 
Motorway density 1.73 0.26 
Old 2.38 0.92 
Young 1.68 0.96 
Point_system 0.68 0.57 
Speed limits 13.74 0 
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TABLE 3. Results of estimates (Country fixed effects with an AR-1 disturbance) 
Independent variables Dependent variable: Fatalities rates per capita 
Life imprisonment 
 
-0.048 
(0.01)*** 
Homicides 
0.018 
(0.014) 
Robbery 
0.0006 
(0.0003) 
Drugs 
0.0004 
(0.0001)*** 
Motor vehicle theft 
 
0.0003 
(0.00008)*** 
Per capita GDP 
0.00006 
(0.000018)*** 
Per capita GDP
2
 
-4.39e-10 
(1.33e-10)*** 
Motorway density 
-0.14 
(0.02)*** 
Motorization 
-0.0007 
(0.0002)*** 
Vehicles-Km driven 
-2.10e-07 
(0.000011) 
BAC_05 
-0.74 
(0.24)*** 
Point_system 
-0.02 
(0.013) 
Speed limits 
0.02 
(0.004)*** 
Old 0.06 
28 
 
(0.02)** 
Young 
0.012 
(0.011) 
R-Sq. 
Test joint sign (Wald 
χ2) 
Number observations 
0.97 
 
519258.91*** 
 
326 
Note 1: Standard errors are given in brackets  
Note 2: Statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
